Growth forecasts stagnate at 1% despite oil price increase

Author: Klaus Dormann

The five leading German economic research institutes published their "Spring Forecasts" for Germany and the global economy on March 12 and 13. Compared to their "winter forecasts" published in mid-December, they have barely raised their expectations for the growth of the Russian economy in 2026 despite the current sharp rise in energy prices. Three months ago, the institutes' forecasts ranged from 0.6 percent to 0.9 percent, now from 0.8 percent to 1.3 percent.

In the analyst survey published by the Russian central bank last week, participants also expected the Russian economy to grow by only 1.0 percent this year, as in 2025. Next year, they expect growth to accelerate slightly to 1.6 percent. Of the German institutes, only the Munich-based ifo Institute believes a similar pick-up in growth is likely in 2027.

Will Russia's budget revenues recover in 2026?

One of the most difficult questions when making economic forecasts at the moment is probably how energy prices will develop. How long will the current sharp rise in oil and gas prices triggered by the Iran war last?

By 2025, Russia's budget revenues from the oil and gas sector will have fallen by almost a quarter to around 8.5 trillion roubles. Will a sufficiently strong price increase in 2026 bring about a recovery in oil and gas revenues?

Russia's budget revenues from the oil and gas sector
in trillions of roubles

euromaidanpress.com; Peeter Helme:
 Russia's oil revenues collapse 24% as global prices slide further (INFOGRAPHICS), 02.02.26

According to a report in the Izvestia newspaper, experts estimate that budget revenues are likely to increase by around 2 trillion roubles in 2026 if the annual average price of Urals oil rises to 70 dollars per barrel, according to a dpa report. BR24 showed the following illustration in a program.

Experts estimate
an increase in budget revenues from the oil and gas sector
by 2 trillion roubles if the price of oil rises to $70/b in 2026

BR24: Oil and gas: How Putin profits from the Iran war; 13.03.26

If budget revenues from the oil and gas sector actually rise to around 10.5 trillion roubles this year, they would still be slightly lower than 11.1 trillion roubles in 2024. Ina Ruck, ARD correspondent in Moscow, commented on Russia's budget development in the BR24 program from minute 8.

Revenues from energy exports also have a lot of catching up to do

Russia's revenues from the export of fossil fuels have slumped to a similar extent as state revenues from the oil and gas sector. According to the Finnish think tank CREA, revenues from the export of oil, gas, coal and refined products fell by 19 percent in the twelve months prior to February 24, 2026 compared to the same period in the previous year. Compared to the period before the start of the war in Ukraine, they were even around 27% lower. This was reported by Tagesschau.de.

The following figure from the "Russia Chartbook" published by the Institute of the Kyiv School of Economics at the end of February shows that Russia's revenues from the export of crude oil and petroleum products will have fallen to USD 160 billion in 2025 according to the Institute's estimates (-15% compared to the previous year). At the same time, revenues from natural gas exports are expected to fall to around USD 40 billion (- 13 %). Overall, these revenues from oil and gas exports were around USD 200 billion, around 15% lower than in 2024 (USD 235 billion).

Exports of crude oil and petroleum products and natural gas
in billion US dollars

KSE institute: Russia Chartbook, February 2026; 27.02.26

In its report published on February 27, the Kiev School of Economics predicted a further sharp decline in revenues from oil and gas exports by around a quarter to only around 150 billion US dollars in 2026. In the report, the institute assumes that global market prices for energy could rise in February and March due to "geopolitical tensions". According to the institute, however, fundamental factors on the oil market suggest a "challenging price environment" for Russia for the rest of the year.

IfW: The price reaction to the "worst case scenario" was "still moderate"

The Kiel Institute for the World Economy comments on the current rise in energy prices in detail in its economic report "World Economy in Spring 2026". The IfW considers the effective closure of the Strait of Hormuz to be the worst possible development in terms of oil prices. The "worst case scenario" has been realized. However, the subsequent reaction of oil prices was "still moderate".

The IfW describes the price development of crude oil as follows:

"The oil price had already been on an upward trend since the end of last year, although production rose faster than consumption and the International Energy Agency expected a supply surplus of almost 3.5 million barrels per day in 2026. This was due to tighter US sanctions on Russian oil and increasing tensions between the United States and Iran.

With the outbreak of war, the "worst case" scenario of past Middle East crises was realized with the effective closure of the Strait of Hormuz. In view of this, the market's reaction was still moderate. Initially, the price jumped by around USD 10 to a good USD 80 per barrel of Brent, then briefly climbed to over USD 100; most recently, at around USD 90, it was quoted at a level that would have been just within the usual price range in 2023 and 2024."

The following figure from the SRF, which is updated hourly, shows that the Brent price had risen further to around 102 US dollars by 13 March.

SRF: Sanctions easing over Iran? Trump plays the oil whisperer - the Kremlin is listening closely; 10.03.26

The IfW comments on the price development of liquefied natural gas (LNG):

"The effects on the LNG market were also significant. Here, prices in Europe roughly doubled; the increase was even stronger in Asia, where the majority (around 80 percent) of the liquefied natural gas volumes supplied from the Persian Gulf are delivered. In contrast, natural gas has hardly risen in price on the American market."

Forecast by the IfW: Oil prices will quickly fall to their pre-war level

The Kiel Institute does not expect a long-lasting phase of high energy prices. On the contrary: it points out that most observers currently assume that oil supplies from the Persian Gulf will return to normal within a few weeks. The institute bases its forecast on a scenario in which oil prices remain at the current high level for three months at most and then fall again rapidly from the summer onwards. 

"We expect energy exports from the Gulf to resume soon and prices to fall rapidly to pre-war levels.The military superiority of the United States and Israel makes it likely that safe passage through the Strait of Hormuz can be restored in the foreseeable future and that the disruption to shipments of crude oil and oil products as well as LNG from the Persian Gulf will last a few weeks at most. In this case, prices for energy commodities are likely to fall again soon."

The Kiel Institute expects the price of crude oil to be roughly as low as before the war by the end of 2026. By the end of 2027, the oil price will fall to the level recorded in the second half of 2025.

The fact that the producer countries organized in OPEC+ have decided to increase production quotas and that the United States is apparently prepared to ease sanctions on Russian oil in order to meet demand will also help to ease the market situation.

According to the IfW, the price of LNG is likely to fall somewhat more slowly. Storage facilities in the northern hemisphere are largely empty after the winter. Refilling over the summer is expected to result in high demand.

However, the Kiel Institute is not entirely certain about its above forecast for the development of the oil market:

"Should it turn out that safe passage through the Strait of Hormuz remains impossible for an extended period of time, or should production facilities in the neighboring states be damaged to a greater extent, resulting in a prolonged period of production downtime that cannot be offset by additional production elsewhere (most of the available short-term reserve capacity in crude oil is in Saudi Arabia), prices would of course be expected to be significantly higher again for a longer period of time."

IfW: Russia's economic growth slowed significantly in 2025

The Kiel Institute for the World Economy is the only one of the five German institutes to offer some information on current economic developments in Russia in its spring forecast. The IfW explains the significant slowdown in Russian economic growth to 1.0 percent in 2025 as follows:  .

"On the one hand, the economy is probably operating at the limits of its capacity. Here the loss of manpower due to the war against Ukraine and emigration is making itself felt, but increasingly also the sanctions-related problems in maintaining and modernizing the capital stock, which is gradually threatening to erode. The prioritization of production for military needs is supported by high real interest rates, which push back private consumption and non-war-related investments. On the other hand, the financial resources to continue the war had deteriorated in the past year with falling oil prices and tightened sanctions."

IfW: Higher energy prices will make it easier to finance the war in Ukraine

In view of the current rise in energy prices, the IfW believes that Russia's ability to finance the war in Ukraine will improve considerably in the coming months:

"Not only is Russia now once again generating significantly more than those 59 US dollars per barrel that were used as the basis for drawing up the Russian state budget. Apparently, the US sanctions, which were tightened at the end of last year to make it more difficult to sell Russian oil, are also to be eased. As a result, the price discounts for Russian oil compared to Western grades such as Brent had widened noticeably, but have now practically disappeared."

Christof Rühl: If anyone is "profiting" from the Iran war, it is Russia

In an interview published by the English service of Deutsche Welle, Christof Rühl, Senior Research Scholar at Columbia University's Center on Global Energy Policy, argues in a very similar way to the Kiel Institute (The Dip podcast from minute 11). As an employee of the World Bank, Rühl was, among other things, Head of the World Bank Representative Office in Moscow from 1998 to 2005 and subsequently Chief Economist of the oil company BP until 2014.

Rühl points out that Russia has been in a difficult situation so far because oil prices have fallen significantly. Following the tightening of sanctions by the USA, Russia has also only been able to supply much less oil to India. The tankers of the Russian "shadow fleet" had been unable to find buyers for enormous quantities of oil. Now, however, the USA has eased the sanctions due to the sharp rise in the price of oil. Russian oil is finding buyers again - and at much higher prices, even if there are still price discounts for Russian oil. Instead of 50 or 55 dollars, Russia can now sell its oil for 95 dollars. That is a very big difference.

Three ifo Institute scenarios for oil price development and the growth of the Russian economy until 2027

In its "Spring Forecast", the Munich-based ifo Institute emphasizes that  it is completely open how the conflict in the Middle East will develop in the coming days and weeks and how it will affect the production of crude oil and natural gas as well as supply chains. It has developed a "de-escalation scenario" and an "escalation scenario" for the further development of the economy. The institute compares these scenarios with a "pre-war scenario" that would have occurred without the "warlike actions".

In the "de-escalation scenario", a rapid end to the conflict is expected following temporary increases in crude oil and natural gas prices to an average of USD 80 per barrel or EUR 55 per MWh in the months of March to May. Once the conflict has been resolved, crude oil prices fall again rapidly in this scenario, but remain higher than before the outbreak of the war. According to ifo, these assumptions on the development of energy prices largely correspond to market expectations on March 4, 2026.

In the "escalation scenario", it is assumed that the conflict will last significantly longer and will be accompanied by a sharper and more sustained rise in energy prices. However, even in this scenario, the ifo Institute assumes a moderate increase in the oil price compared to other forecasts of only around 21% year-on-year in 2026/2025.

In order to quantify the economic impact of the Iran war, ifo compares these scenarios with a "pre-war scenario". The assumptions of the pre-war scenario correspond to the market expectations for the course of energy prices before the outbreak of the war at the end of February.

Scenarios of the ifo Institute from 12.03.26
for the Brent oil price development
and the growth of the Russian economy

Even in the "escalation scenario", GDP growth accelerates only slightly

In the "de-escalation scenario", it is assumed that the Brent crude oil price will only increase by around 5 percent on average in 2026 if it rises from $68.4/barrel in 2025 to $71.9/barrel in 2026. With this oil price development, the ifo Institute assumes that Russia's real gross domestic product will grow by 1.1% in 2026, as in 2025. In 2027, the ifo Institute expects economic growth to accelerate slightly to 1.4 percent with an oil price that is around 1 percent lower at 70 dollars.

In the "escalation scenario", the Institute forecasts that Russia's economy will grow by 1.3 percent in 2026 with an increase in the oil price of around 21 percent, which is slightly stronger than in the "de-escalation scenario" with growth of 1.1 percent. In 2027, the oil price will only fall to 75 dollars in the "escalation scenario". Economic growth would then increase to 1.5 percent, hardly more than in the "de-escalation scenario" (+ 1.4 percent).

According to the "pre-war scenario" - i.e. without the war - the oil price would fall to 65.9 dollars in 2026 and further to 64.5 dollars in 2027. With this drop in the oil price, Russia's economic growth would fall to 0.9 percent in 2026 and would only recover to 1.2 percent in 2027.

German institutes raise their growth forecasts only slightly

A comparison of the winter and spring forecasts of the five leading German economic research institutes shows that their forecasts for growth in the Russian economy in 2026 remain unchanged (RWI Essen: 0.8%) or have only been raised to around 1%.

The Kiel Institute raised its forecast the most (from 0.5% to 1.0%). The DIW Berlin now expects 0.9% growth in Russia (previously: 0.6%), the IWH Halle 1.1% (previously: +0.7%).

The Munich-based ifo Institute previously expected growth of 0.9% in the current year. The institute would have stuck to this forecast had it not been for the war in Iran and the rise in energy prices. In its new "de-escalation scenario" with an early end to the war and a weak rise in oil prices, the ifo Institute now expects slightly higher growth of 1.1% in Russia in 2026. In an "escalation scenario" with an oil price increase of around 20 percent, the ifo Institute expects an even slightly stronger GDP increase of 1.3 percent.

The DIW, IWH and RWI also expect an increase in overall economic production of around 1 percent in Russia in 2027. The IfW Kiel, on the other hand, maintains its estimate that Russia's GDP will only increase by half as much at 0.5 percent. In contrast, the ifo Institute is increasing its growth forecast for 2027 from 0.5% to 1.4% in its "de-escalation scenario" and slightly more to 1.5% in its "escalation scenario".

GDP forecasts 2024 to 2027
Change in real gross domestic product compared to the previous year in percent

Results of the central bank survey for inflation, key interest rate and growth

The Russian central bank conducted another analyst survey (Survey Calendar) in the run-up to its next key interest rate decision on March 20. The survey was conducted from March 6 to 10, just a few days after the US and Israeli attacks on Iran began on February 28.

In the survey, participants expected a slight acceleration in the growth of overall economic production from 1.0% to 1.6% next year, following stagnation in real gross domestic product growth in 2026. The increase in consumer prices will slow from 8.7% on average in 2025 to 5.3% on average in 2026 and fall further to 4.4% in 2027.

The 30 or so participants expect the following development for 2026:

The annual increase in the consumer price index will slow to 5.3% in December 2026. In December 2025, the annual inflation rate had already fallen to 5.6 percent. At the end of 2024, it had reached 9.5%.

On average, the annual inflation rate will fall to just 5.3% in 2026. At an annual average of 8.7 percent in 2025, it was still slightly higher than in 2024 (+8.4 percent).

The annual average key interest rate will be 14.0 percent in the current year, a good 5 percentage points lower than in 2025 (19.2 percent).

Annual economic growth will stagnate at 1.0 percent in 2026. In 2025, it had fallen from 4.9 to 1.0 per cent.

Results of the central bank survey from 6 to 10 March 2026
(results of the February survey in brackets)

Russian Central Bank: Macroeconomic survey of the Bank of Russia, 11.03.26 (excerpt)

Survey: Inflation will still significantly exceed the 4% target at the end of 2026

The following figure shows the expected development of the inflation rate according to the analyst survey. The inflation rate of 4.0% targeted by the central bank will not yet be reached by the end of 2026 according to the average of the survey participants' estimates (black line). According to the survey, consumer prices will still rise by 5.3% in December 2026 (i.e. slightly above the range of 4.5% to 5.5% stated in the central bank's medium-term forecast). According to the survey, the inflation target will almost be reached by the end of 2027 with a price increase of 4.1 per cent.

Consumer price index
Increase in December compared to December of the previous year in %

Sceptical growth forecast for 2026: GDP only increases by around 1 percent

The expectations of survey participants regarding economic growth have deteriorated slightly further since the February survey. After an increase in real gross domestic product of 1.0% in 2025, production is expected to stagnate at this level in 2026. GDP growth is expected to accelerate to 1.6% in 2027 and 1.8% in 2028. However, the analysts' growth forecasts from 2027 onwards remain far below the government's forecasts, which anticipate growth rates of 2.8% and 2.5% in 2027 and 2028 respectively.

Real gross domestic product
Change compared to previous year in percent

Russian Central Bank: Macroeconomic survey of the Bank of Russia, 11.03.26

Possible impact of the Iran war on the oil price and rouble exchange rate

The Iran war, which began at the end of February, is likely to have had a particular impact on the survey's assessment of the development of the oil price and the rouble exchange rate.

The forecasts for the average annual oil price (for tax purposes) were raised by around 10 percent on average for 2026, from $50/barrel to $55/barrel.

In the next two years, however, the analysts expect slightly lower oil prices than before. Their oil price forecast for 2027 fell from $56/barrel to $55/barrel and for 2028 from $60/barrel to $59/barrel.

The analysts expect a slightly weaker depreciation of the rouble against the US dollar over the next three years than in the last survey. They have lowered their forecasts for the average annual ruble/US dollar exchange rate as follows:

For 2026 to 84.0 rubles – from previously 85 rubles/US dollar,
for 2027 to 92.3 rubles – from previously 94.5 rubles/US dollar,
for 2028 to 97.8 rubles – from previously 98.9 rubles/US dollar.

Reading tips:

• German-Russian Chamber of Commerce Abroad:
  Analyses, German; also Russian; (selection):
  Hormus shock: How big will Russia's unexpected oil windfall be? 11.03.26Economic consequences of the Iran war: oil price, Russia, tourism; 02.03.26Weak growth, declining available reserves and high military spending, 18.02.26
• Podcast "Tsars, Data, Facts" of the German-Russian Chamber of Commerce Abroad by Thomas Baier:
  Russia’s Economy: Sanctions and Growth Prospects; Guest: Prof. Jacques Sapir, 44 min, 09.03.26Low gas storage levels: Europe's challenge in the energy market; Guest: Dr. Heiko Lohmann, „energate Gasmarkt“; 34 min., 01.03.26
• "Die Presse" podcast on the Russian economy: Russia - gas, sanctions, oligarchs:
  Is Russia the big profiteer of the Iran war and China the loser? Recorded on 10.03.26;
  The Ukraine war has made Russia the economic loser and China the profiteer. The Iran war, however, has a completely different impact. Vladimir Putin is already laughing up his sleeve. And China? Sinology professor Dr. Susanne Weigelin-Schwiedrzik and Russian economist Vasily Astrov (WIIW) in conversation with Eduard Steiner; 11.03.26

Iran war, energy supply and Russia

• BBC Newscast with Steve Rosenberg in Moscow: Will Putin benefit from the Iran war? Steve Rosenberg about the US decision to loosen sanctions on Russian oil, 15.03.26
• Deutsche Welle; The Dip Podcast: The cost-of-living shock if the Hormuz stays shut; Christof Rühl, formerly Head of the World Bank Representation in Moscow, now Senior Research Scholar at the Center on Global Energy Policy at Columbia University, explains, among other things, why Russia is profiting from the Iran war. Neil Shearing, chief economist at Capital Economics, explains the possible consequences of higher energy costs for Europe, Asia and the US - from inflation to delayed interest rate cuts, 14.03.26
• Sky News Explainer: Why Russia is the big winner in Trump’s war with Iran. Sky’s Paul Kelso looks at how soaring oil prices are benefiting Vladimir Putin and Russia’s war against Ukraine, 13.03.26
• Al Jazeera English: Who wins and loses in the global energy crisis? Guests: Adi Imsirovic, former global head of oil at Gazprom Marketing & Trading; lecturer in energy studies, Oxford University; Neil Atkinson, National Center for Energy Analytics; Muyu Xu, Senior Crude Oil Analyst, Kpler; 13.03.26
• BR24: Oil and gas: How Putin profits from the Iran war; Sanctions against Russia are eased and the purchase of Russian crude oil and Russian petroleum products is briefly permitted; with Prof. Klemens Fischer, University of Cologne, and ARD correspondent Ina Ruck,13.03.26
• Rüdiger von Fritsch, former German ambassador to Russia, in a DLF interview by Dirk-Oliver Heckmann: Iran war: The great benefit for Putin and Russia, audio, 8 min.,13.03.26
• Joe Blog's video: Force Majeure Explosion. Energy markets are entering dangerous territory. Oil prices have surged above $100 per barrel as the war in Iran approaches the two-week mark, 13.03.26
• ZDF heute live: Marcus Keupp, lecturer in military economics at the ETH Zurich Military Academy, interviewed by Marc Burgemeister: Has Trump miscalculated? Iran war also has consequences for Russia and Ukraine, 12.03.26
• Deutsche Welle discussion „To the point“: Oil shock from the Iran war: Who loses – and who really benefits? Moderation: Tina Gerhäusser; Guests: Prof. Claudia Kemfert, Head of Department DIW Berlin; Markus Bickel, Editorial Director of the Security.Table newsletter at Table Media; Ulrike Herrmann, TAZ journalist; 12.03.26
• The Time Podcast „What now? - The Week“: Oil as a weapon: The power play behind the Iran war. How great is the danger of a new global oil price shock? Is the conflict in the Middle East accelerating a new phase of economic and geopolitical bloc formation? Dilan Gropengiesser talks about this with Dr. Eva Seiwert from the Mercator Institute for China Studies, 12.03.26
• Deutsche Welle News.com: How Russia seeks economic and strategic gains from the Iran war; Guest: Ivana Stradner, Foundation for Defense of Democracies, 12.03.26
• mk.ru; Igor Bokovu: The US has issued a one-month license for the processing of Russian oil: Experts have analyzed the consequences. 12.03.26
• Watson.ch; AFP Moscow: "Russia's reputation in Iran inevitably suffers". Russia benefits from Iran war, Putin's reputation in the region suffers, 11.03.26
• DLF. The Day, Philipp May. Folge des Iran-Kriegs – Kommt jetzt die nächste Energiekrise?, 11.03.26
• FR.de; Mark Simon Wolf: Oil price shock as Putin's bonus: Is the Iran war, of all things, filling Russia's war chest? 10.03.26
• Sky News Analysis; Sky’s Ed Conway explains: Will emergency oil reserve release bring costs down? Countries in the International Energy Agency, including the UK, have agreed to release 400 million barrels of oil to curb rising prices,11.03.26
• Bloomberg Podcast "Odd Lots": Rory Johnston, author of the newsletter "Commodity Context", explains how the oil price could rise to over 200 dollars per barrel, 10.03.26
• World News Channel: WAR AGAINST IRAN: Now dealmaker Trump appears to offer Putin the prospect of easing sanctions; Christoph Wanner from Kiev, 10.03.26
• BBC News: Could countries run out of oil and gas amid the US-Israel war with Iran? The BBC's deputy economics editor Dharshini David, Middle East correspondent Barbara Plett Usher, and energy analyst Bill Farren-Price answer questions, 09.03.26
• aawsat.com: Four Years into War, Russia's Energy Revenues Drop but Oil Keeps Flowing, 28.02.26
• DLF Background; Gunnar Köhne: Erdölgeschäfte – Russlands Schattenflotte auf Europas Gewässern; 19 Min, 26.02.26

Oil prices and state budget

• Yahoo Finance; Artur Kryzhnyi, Financial Times: Russia to gain billions in additional revenue from oil price surge due to war with Iran, 12.03.26
• German-Russian Chamber of Commerce Abroad; Analysis: Hormus shock: How big will Russia's unexpected oil windfall be? 11.03.26
• Joe Blogs video: RUSSIA’s Secret. A new report from German intelligence suggests Russia's real budget deficit could be more than $30 billion higher than the official figures published by Moscow. In this video we break down: - the intelligence report claiming Russia is hiding the real deficit, - why oil revenues are falling - how the strong ruble is damaging government finances - the impact of high interest rates on the economy - signs that Russian consumers are cutting back - and whether Russia can continue funding the war at the current pace, 11.03.26
• FR:de; Felix Busjaeger: Schwimmende Kriegskasse: Wie eine Blockade von Putins Schattenflotte den Krieg beenden könnte; 11.03.26
• Global Banking & Finance Review: Russian oil price used for taxation exceeds budget target, helping state coffers, 11.03.26
• Reuters, Energy News: Sources say that Russia is preparing a 10% cut in ’non sensitive‘ spending by 2026, 11.03.26
• Expert.ru: Budget deficit amounted to 3.45 trillion rubles in January and February,11.03.26
• FR.de; Simon Schröder: Russlands Wirtschaft kurz vor dem Kollaps: EU-Sanktionsbeauftragter sieht "Hemingway-Moment" nahen, 11.03.26
• Börsennews.de; dpa: Hoher Ölpreis erfreut Russland - Wie stark profitiert Putin? 10.03.26
• New Izvestia; Maria Sokolova: A deficit of 3.5 trillion: Where has the Russian state budget sunk to and will high oil prices remedy the situation? The decline in oil and gas revenues has led to a huge deficit in the Russian state budget, 10.03.26
• Commersant: Oil and gas revenues in the Russian state budget fell by 47% in January and February, 10.03.26
• Alfa Bank; Pavel Gavrilov, investment analyst: Oil price rises and falls: from 120 to 90 dollars in one day. Cheap oil could be a thing of the past. Prospects for the commodities market, 10.03.26
• FOCUS-online; dpa: Billion rubles extra: Oil price shock makes Russia rejoice, 10.03.26
• dts news agency: EU sanctions commissioner David O'Sullivan sees the Russian economy on the brink of collapse, 10.03.26
• SRF:Sanctions easing because of Iran? Trump plays the oil whisperer - the Kremlin is listening closely. The US president wants to end his "brief detour" to Iran soon. This is proving to be good business for Russia;10.03.26
• n-tv.de: Putin offers Europe oil supplies – under conditions, 09.03.26
• The Moscow Times: Low Oil Prices, Strong Ruble Squeezed Russia's Budget in February, 09.03.26
• Commersant: Sofia Donetsk, Chief Economist at T-Investments, on the reasons for and consequences of the change in budget rules: Austerity is painful for the economy, 09.03.26
• Politico.eu; Eva Hartog: Why Vladimir Putin is the biggest winner from the war in Iran. U.S.-Israeli strikes have driven up the price of oil, strengthening the Kremlin's ability to fund its military campaign, 09.03.26
• Andreas Goldthau, Professor of Public Policy at the University of Efurt, in a DLF interview by Bianca von der Au: Börsengespräch: 100 USD/Barrel - Warum der Ölpreis weiter rapide steigt, 09.03.26
• SberCIB Investment Research: Oil market: The impact of the Middle East conflict and the blockade of the Strait of Hormuz on global oil prices and Russia, 06.03.26
• bne IntelliNews, Ben Aris: Russia's oil windfall from Middle East conflict already apparent, but may prove fleeting, 05.03.26
• Joe Blogs video: Russia crippled. Russia's oil industry is facing a growing list of problems - and rising global oil prices may not be enough to solve them, 10 Min., 05.03.26
• CEPA; Alexander Kolyandr: Iran War Won't Save Putin's Crumbling Economy. Russia is in serious trouble from a ballooning budget deficit. Rising oil prices are unlikely to change the math, 04.03.26
• GIS Report; Carole Nakhle: Shadow fleet keeps Russia's oil exports beyond Western reach, 02.03.26
• FinanceRambler: Oil and gas prices rising due to the Middle East war: What does this mean for Russia and the rouble? 02.03.26
• Inosmi.ru; Berliner Zeitung: Öl für Indien, LNG für Europa: Der Iran-Krieg bringt Russland zurück ins Spiel; BZ: Indien erwägt, die Öllieferungen aus Russland zu erhöhen; 03.03.26; Originalartikel, 02.03.26
• Meduza; Yulia Starostina: Russia's oil and gas revenues are shrinking. Meduza explains what that means for the Kremlin's war chest, 28.01.26

Spring forecasts by German institutes:

• DIW Berlin: DIW-Wochenbericht: Deutsche Wirtschaft im Aufschwung - Weltwirtschaft wächst moderat weiter, 13.03.26
• IWH Halle: Konjunktur aktuell: Ölpreisschock gefährdet Erholung in Deutschland, 12.03.26
• IfW Kiel: Weltwirtschaft im Frühjahr 2026, 12.03.26
• RWI Essen: Economic report spring 2026: Rising energy costs weigh on economic recovery, 12.03.26
• Ifo Institute Munich: ifo Economic Forecast Spring 2026: Consequences of Iran war dampen recovery, 12.03.26

Monthly and weekly economic reports:

• CREA, Vaibhav Raghunandan: February 2026 - Monthly analysis of Russian fossil fuel exports and sanctions, 12.03.26
• CMASF Monthly Report: Trends in the Russian economy, January 2026, 12.03.26
• Politcom.ru; Marina Voitenko: Weak macrodynamics require regulatory support, 12.03.26
• Sergei Blinov: Russia's economy has been chronically lagging behind the global average since 2013; in: Macro Overview No. 10 (2026), 11.03.26
• Kyiv School of Economics: Russia Chart Book February 2026, 27.02.26
• CMASF, Moscow: Basic version of the macroeconomic forecast for 2026-2029, 27.02.26
• CMASF Monthly Report: "Analysis of macroeconomic trends", 27.02.26

More economic data and forecasts:

• Interfax.ru: The Russian central bank pointed to an expected slowdown in economic activity at the beginning of the year. The reasons include tax changes that required businesses and the population to make adjustments, holidays and the weather. 12.03.26
• Finmarket.ru: The Russian economy is on the verge of stagflation, 10.03.26
• Newdaynews.ru; Natalia Petrova: Just one step away from stagnation: Russia's economy is on the verge of stagflation; 10.03.26
• Tagesspiegel; Miriam Rathje: "Russland steht kurz vor einer Finanzkrise": Warum wirtschaftlicher Druck Putin nicht zum Einlenken bewegen wird, 10.03.26

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